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THE SECOND AMENDMENT BURDEN: ARMING COURTS 
WITH A WORKABLE STANDARD FOR REVIEWING GUN 
SAFETY LEGISLATION 
MELANIE KALMANSON∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 Two controversial topics; one framework. Jurisprudence surrounding the Second 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution lacks a workable standard under which courts are to 
review gun control legislation. This Note presents an intersectional argument whereby the 
abortion “undue burden” framework is applied to Second Amendment legislation. Through 
this approach of applying the abortion framework to gun control legislation, like those re-
cently proposed or discussed, this Note argues that these provisions would likely be consti-
tutional. Though abortion is at the center of this discussion, this Note does not aim to con-
tribute to discourse concerning reproductive rights and accepts prima facie the current-
standing framework. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The right to bear arms and the right to choose to have an abortion 
are both guaranteed to all Americans by the U.S. Constitution,1 de-
spite generally having starkly different constituencies—the former 
                                                                                                                  
 ∗ J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 2016, Magna Cum Laude. Thanks 
to Professor Mary Ziegler and my law school roommate, Zachary Pechter, for their valuable 
help with this piece. 
 1. See U.S. CONST. amends. II, XIV. 
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being conservative men2 and the latter being young or minority wom-
en.3 While abortion numbers in the United States seem to be decreas-
ing,4 mass gun violence is increasing.5 
 “There are more guns owned by civilians in the United States 
than any other country.”6 In 2013, there were 112 guns for every 100 
Americans, totaling 357,000,000 guns in the United States.7 On av-
erage, there are 12,000 firearm homicides in America each year; add 
                                                                                                                  
 2. See LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 157 (1st ed. 2014); David T. Hardy, Gun Owners, Gun Legislation, 
and Compromise, 31 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 33, 46-47 (2014); Jeffrey M. Jones, Men, Married, 
Southerners Most Likely to Be Gun Owners, GALLUP (Feb. 1, 2013), http:// www.gallup.com/ 
poll/160223/men-married-southerners-likely-gun-owners.aspx [https://perma.cc/38XU-QJVG]; 
Rich Morin, The Demographics and Politics of Gun-Owning Households, PEW RES. CTR. (July 
15, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/15/the-demographics-and-politics-of-
gun-owning-households/ [https://perma.cc/GEP7-9AVB]. 
 3. E.g., Zoe Dutton, Abortion’s Racial Gap, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 22, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/09/abortions-racial-gap/380251/ 
[https://perma.cc/HSK9-PZ5C]. But see MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF 
THE ABORTION DEBATE 7 (2015) (discussing the “German measles outbreak [that] reframed 
abortion . . . as a procedure sought by respectable, white, middle-class women”). Note, how-
ever, this does not mean that conservative women do not seek abortions. 
 4. Dutton, supra note 3. 
 5. See Guns in the US: The Statistics Behind the Violence, BBC (Jan. 5, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34996604 [https://perma.cc/4JBA-ZA4U] [here-
inafter Guns in the US] (reporting “372 mass shootings in the US in 2015”). A mass shoot-
ing is defined as “[four] or more shot and/or killed in a single event . . . , not including the 
shooter.” Main Page, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, http://www.shootingtracker.com/Main_Page 
[https://perma.cc/W8SS-BFRZ] (last visited Sept. 9, 2016) (FBI derived definition); see also 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1176 (10th ed., 2014 Thompson Reuters) (defining “mass mur-
der” as “[a] murderous act or series of acts by which a criminal kills many victims at or 
near the same time”). But see, e.g., Max Ehrenfreund, We’ve Had a Massive Decline in Gun 
Violence in the United States. Here’s Why., WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/12/03/weve-had-a-massive-decline-in-
gun-violence-in-the-united-states-heres-why/ [https://perma.cc/Y5KA-RC9M] (“Premeditated 
mass shootings in public places are happening more often . . . .”). 
 6. Ray Sanchez, Death and Guns in the USA: The Story in Six Graphs, CNN  
(Oct. 3, 2015, 9:01 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/03/us/gun-deaths-united-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/WAL2-UAR3]. 
 7. Christopher Ingraham, There Are Now More Guns Than People in the United 
States, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/ 
2015/10/05/guns-in-the-united-states-one-for-every-man-woman-and-child-and-then-some/ 
?utm_term=.3b85d339b395 [https://perma.cc/T6HK-7HEE]; U.S. and World Population 
Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popclock/?intcmp=home_pop (last vis-
ited Sept. 9, 2016) (reporting population of 317,773,895 as of December 31, 2013). This 
updated ratio was calculated by: 357,000,000/318,000,000. This was a significant increase 
from 2007. ANTHONY WALSH & CRAIG HEMMENS, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINOLOGY 384 
(3d ed., 2014); Sanchez, supra note 6. In 2011, forty-seven percent of Americans report-
ed having a gun in their home, the highest rate since 1993. Jaime Fuller, It’s Been 20 
Years Since the Brady Bill Passed. Here Are 11 Ways Gun Politics Have Changed., 
WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2014; 12:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/ 
wp/2014/02/28/its-been-20-years-since-the-brady-law-passed-how-have-gun-politics-changed/ 
[https:// perma.cc/2DGV-HATZ] (citing U.S. Gun Households, 1991-2011, GALLUP POLL 
(Oct. 2011)); see TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 157. 
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to that approximately 19,000 suicides per year using guns.8 In 2012, 
the number of gun murders per capita in the United States was ap-
proximately thirty times that in the United Kingdom—a country 
with strict gun control laws.9 In 2015, at least 13,286 people were 
killed and 26,819 injured by guns in the United States.10 In 2016, at 
least 15,078 people were killed and 30,615 injured by guns in the 
United States.11 Of these people, 3,801 minors were killed or injured 
by firearms.12 Yet, despite these statistics, firearm proponents urge 
American lawmakers to allow civilians unfettered access to firearms 
under the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.13 
 In 2011, 16.9 abortions were performed per 1,000 women of 
childbearing age, accounting for 1,100,000 abortions in the United 
States that year.14 In 2012, there were 699,202 “legal induced abor-
tions” reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention—a 
significant decrease from the 2011 number.15 In 2013, that number 
dropped to 664,435—a decrease of five percent.16 The pro-life move-
ment pushes lawmakers and lay people to view abortion as murder,17 
notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 declaration that 
Americans, specifically women, have a fundamental right to choose to 
abort a pregnancy until the point of viability.18 Where gun control is 
lacking any controlling standard, abortion jurisprudence applies the 
standard that States cannot impose any restriction that imposes an 
undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion.19  
                                                                                                                  
 8. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 157. In 2010, an additional 338,000 nonfatal 
crimes were committed with guns. Id.  
 9. Guns in the US, supra note 5; see WALSH & HEMMENS, supra note 7, at 384. 
 10. Guns in the US, supra note 5. 
 11. Past Summary Ledgers, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, http://www.gunviolencearchive.org/ 
past-tolls [https://perma.cc/SRA4-ZVYP].  
 12. Id. (3,128 teens between 12 and 17 years of age + 673 children between 0 and 11 
years of age). 
 13. See infra notes 115-16.  
 14. Dutton, supra note 3. 
 15. Data and Statistics: Abortion, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdcgov/mmwr/volumes/66/ss/ss6624a1.htm?s_cid=ss6624a1_w [https://perma.cc/J2TH-59W5]. 
 16. Id. 
 17. This view comes from viewing the fetus as a life that is ended when a pregnancy is 
aborted. E.g., Paige Comstock Cunningham, Is Abortion a Women’s Issue? Pro-Life, 5 
UPDATE ON LAW RELATED EDUC. 6, 9 (1981) (arguing that biological evidence establishes 
that a fetus is a life); Jean Rosenbluth, Abortion as Murder: Why Should Women Get Off? 
Using Scare Tactics to Preserve Choice, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1237, 1247 (1993). 
 18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 
(2007). Viability is “the point at which a fetus could potentially live outside the mother’s 
womb without medical aid.” ZIEGLER, supra note 3, at 11. This point has not been specifi-
cally defined by the medical community. 
 19. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 146 (applying the “undue burden” framework from Casey); 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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 While abortion and gun control divide the country politically, this 
Note argues that the relationship between the two is constitutionally 
instructive. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Second Amendment jurispru-
dence is in flux and provides little guidance to courts reviewing gun 
control legislation. In response, this Note argues that the “undue 
burden” test—the cornerstone of the U.S. Supreme Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence—intuits a reasonable approach to reviewing gun safety 
legislation. Part II describes the current-standing abortion frame-
work, contextualizing the three most significant U.S. Supreme Court 
rulings, including its most recent in 2016,20 to develop and explain 
the standard being cross-applied here. Part III defines the current-
standing gun control framework transpiring from the Second 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, legislation, and statutory pro-
visions. Part IV merges the two frameworks, contending that the 
“undue burden” framework is an immediate and workable solution to 
the lack of guidance and structure in Second Amendment jurispru-
dence at a time where gun control is at the forefront. Part V con-
cludes, urging courts to borrow from abortion jurisprudence for a 
workable standard to apply in reviewing much-needed legislation 
regulating firearms in the United States.  
II.   CURRENT ABORTION FRAMEWORK 
 To apply the current abortion structure elsewhere, as this Note 
does, its function and background must generally be understood.21 
This Part discusses the Court’s recognition of the right to choose to 
terminate a pregnancy and the Court’s progression towards the cur-
rent-standing ‘undue burden’ standard. Starting with Roe v. Wade in 
1973, which is viewed as the beginning of modern polarization on the 
abortion debate,22 the Court established that the right to have an 
abortion is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.23 Contrary to popular belief, 
however, there was a long history of abortion contention before Roe v. 
Wade.24 Though the contentions are characterized differently today, 
abortion “had drawn attention to fundamental questions about the 
rights of women, the boundaries of medical authority, and the proper 
                                                                                                                  
 20. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 21. For more in-depth conversation on the “undue burden” standard from the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
see Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the Evisceration of 
Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291 (2009); Khiara M. Bridges, Captur-
ing the Judiciary: Carhart and the Undue Burden Standard, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915 
(2010); Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under 
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008). 
 22. See ZIEGLER, supra note 3, at 9. 
 23. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. 
 24. ZIEGLER, supra note 3, at 9. 
2016]  THE SECOND AMENDMENT BURDEN 351 
   
 
definition of personhood” even before Roe was listed on the Court’s 
docket.25 Roe arose as a response to “efforts to secure constitutional 
protection for reproductive rights.”26  
 Section A of this Part explains the milestone Roe v. Wade opinion. 
Section B then contextualizes the Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pennsylvania v. Casey case in the wake of reactions to Roe and 
explains the current precedent that Casey established for abortion 
review, analyzes the Court’s most recent decision on abortion in 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt27 and how it contributed to the 
“undue burden” standard, and explains how the “undue burden” logic 
underlies several topics outside of abortion, providing background 
and support for the argument herein that the “undue burden” 
framework is capable of intersectional application. 
A.   Roe v. Wade: Establishing the Fundamental Right to Choose 
 In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of 
two Texas statutes that criminalized abortion and a Georgia statute 
that required a woman to obtain approval from a medical panel be-
fore receiving an abortion.28 Plaintiff, Jane Roe, was a single woman 
who “was unable to get a ‘legal’ abortion . . . because her life did not 
appear to be threatened by . . . her pregnancy.”29 James Hubert Hall-
ford, a physician who was arrested under the Texas statute for 
providing abortions, intervened in the action,30 claiming the statutes 
were too vague and provided too little guidance to abortion providers 
who were required to determine when providing an abortion would be 
legal.31 John and Mary Doe, plaintiffs in a companion complaint, filed 
suit on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated couples who 
experience fertility difficulties and may find themselves needing an 
abortion.32 Interpreting the Article III standing doctrine,33 the Court 
determined that jurisdiction was proper for the Roes’ and Does’ ap-
peal because pregnancy presented a different circumstance than oth-
er injuries at law that justified an exception, or alteration, to the in-
jury in fact standing requirement—a limited time period and likeli-
hood of repetition to the same person.34 In other words, because the 
                                                                                                                  
 25. Id. For further discussion of the pre-Roe abortion debate and history, see generally 
id. at Introduction. 
 26. Id. at 9. 
 27. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).  
 28. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113, 117-18; ZIEGLER, supra note 3, at 11. 
 29. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120. 
 30. Id. at 120-21.  
 31. Id. The Court dismissed Hallford’s complaint in intervention. Id. at 127. 
 32. Id. at 121. 
 33. See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 34. Roe, 410 U.S. at 125, 127-29. 
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Roes and/or Does could have become pregnant again and pregnancy 
is naturally limited to nine months, which may be insufficient to fully 
litigate a claim, the Court accepted that the injury, which originally 
brought rise to the lawsuit, was technically no longer present.35 
 Upon review, grounding its decision in the long-standing “guaran-
tee of personal privacy”36 from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause, the Roe Court established that a woman has a fun-
damental right to “deci[de] whether or not to terminate her pregnan-
cy.”37 The Court explained that when a state denies this choice to a 
woman, it imposes great detriment upon her, including maternal dif-
ficulties, “[p]sychological harm,” distress from an unwanted child, the 
“stigma of unwed motherhood,” etc.38 Despite recognizing this right 
as fundamental, though, the Court reserved related state interests, 
declining to make the right to an abortion absolute.39 
 Here arises the trimester framework that was established in Roe 
and used to review abortion legislation thereafter. Applying strict 
scrutiny,40 the Court recognized the State’s “interests in safeguarding 
health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential 
life.”41 The Court determined that the State’s “important and legiti-
mate interest” in the mother’s health begins at the end of the first 
trimester; therefore, the State must leave the decision to abort a 
pregnancy to a woman and her physician during the first trimester 
before this point.42 In the second trimester, once the State’s interests 
have ripened, the State may regulate abortions “to the extent that 
the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection 
of maternal health.”43 Then, upon fetal viability,44 the State has an 
“important and legitimate interest in potential life” and can regulate 
abortions to protect fetal life, “except when [abortion] is necessary to 
                                                                                                                  
 35. See id. at 128. 
 36. Id. at 152-53 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54, 460, 463-65 (1972); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319, 325 (1937); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923)). 
 37. Id. at 153. 
 38. Id.; accord id. at 162-63. Cf. Siegel, supra note 21, at 1714-19, 1726 (explaining 
that this protective argument for the mother’s well-being became a strategy to further the 
elimination of abortion). 
 39. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-55 (citations omitted). 
 40. Id. at 155-56 (citations omitted); see also Roe v. Wade (1973), LEGAL INFO. INST., 
CORNELL U. L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/roe_v._wade_1973 (last visited Sept. 9, 
2016) (“[G]overnment regulation of abortions must meet strict scrutiny in judicial review.”). 
 41. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
 42. Id. at 163. 
 43. Id.; see ZIEGLER, supra note 3, at 11. 
 44. See Cunningham, supra note 17. 
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preserve the life or health of the mother.”45 Establishing this tri-
mester framework and using it to review the statutes sub judice, the 
Roe Court invalidated the Texas statutes.46 Roe’s trimester frame-
work served as the abortion structure for almost twenty years.  
B.   Precedential “Undue Burden” Framework 
 Despite some predictions, abortion was not a settled issue in the 
wake of Roe.47 As abortion discourse and legislation progressed after 
Roe, the competing interests involved in the abortion conversation 
became clearer. These interests contextualize the Court’s plurality 
decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Ca-
sey,48 nineteen years after Roe, and the majority decision in Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,49 twenty-four years after Casey. This 
Section discusses these decisions which developed the “undue bur-
den” standard to where it is today. 
1.   Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
 In Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed five provisions of the 
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982:50 (1) informed consent,51 
(2) parental consent,52 (3) spousal consent,53 (4) medical emergency 
exception,54 and (5) clinic reporting requirements.55 The provisions 
reviewed in Casey reflect the pro-life incrementalist strategy that 
                                                                                                                  
 45. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. 
 46. Id. at 164-65. 
 47. See generally ZIEGLER, supra note 3 (discussing the development of abortion poli-
tics after Roe). 
 48. 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).  
 49. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 50. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. 
 51. This provision required a woman to “give her informed consent prior to the abor-
tion procedure” after receiving “certain information at least 24 hours before the [proce-
dure].” Id. at 844; accord 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990); see also Siegel, supra note 21, 
at 1712 (explaining how informed consent was an invention by incrementalists). The Court 
upheld this as constitutional so long as the information provided is “truthful [and] nonmis-
leading.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-87. 
 52. This provision required a minor to obtain the informed consent of a parent or judi-
cial bypass to seek an abortion. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. 
 53. This provision required “married wom[e]n seeking an abortion [to] sign a state-
ment indicating that [they] notified [their] husband of [the] intended abortion.” Id. 
 54. This provision excused compliance with the preceding provisions in case of a “med-
ical emergency.” Id. “Medical emergency” was defined in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (1990) 
as a “condition which, on the basis of the physician’s good faith clinical judgment, so com-
plicates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abor-
tion of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious risk of sub-
stantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 879. 
This provision was upheld as constitutional. Id. at 880. 
 55. These provisions required abortion-providing facilities to report certain infor-
mation. Id. at 844. 
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emerged after Roe.56 Once Roe established that women must have the 
choice to have an abortion,57 pro-life incrementalism sought to side-
step Roe by enacting restrictions that would further complicate a 
woman’s access to abortion without restricting abortion altogether.58 
Proponents of this strategy believed that with enough cumulative 
success from incremental provisions restricting access to abortion, 
the pro-life movement could accomplish its overall mission of elimi-
nating abortion and thereby undermine the Court’s holding in Roe.59 
“Incrementalists’ focus on middle-ground restrictions stemmed from 
a belief that the pro-life movement had to achieve something concrete 
in order to remain a viable political force.”60 
 Primarily resting on stare decisis to safeguard the Court’s legiti-
macy, the Casey Court affirmed the “essential holding” of Roe v. 
Wade61 that a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion is funda-
mental under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of personal 
liberty interests.62 The Casey Court then overturned the procedural 
aspect of Roe, namely the trimester framework, and, relying on scien-
tific advances, presented a new standard for reviewing restrictive 
abortion legislation.63 The Casey Court (1) determined that Roe’s tri-
mester framework was too rigid and “undervalue[d] the State’s  
interest in the potential [fetal] life” and (2) created the “undue  
burden” framework.64  
 Under this new standard, “[o]nly where state regulation imposes 
an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make th[e] decision [to have 
an abortion] does the power of the State reach into the heart of the 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth 
Amendment].”65 Thus, an abortion-restrictive statute is valid so long 
as it does not create such an undue burden. Applying this framework 
and upholding most of the provisions under review, the Court as-
                                                                                                                  
 56. See ZIEGLER, supra note 3, at 62-71 (discussing the incrementalist strategy and  
its development). 
 57. Id. at 185. 
 58. Id. at 58; Siegel, supra note 38, at 1708-09. 
 59. ZIEGLER, supra note 3, at 59. The Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Car-
hart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007), was seen as an incrementalist victory. Siegel, supra note 21, 
at 1708. But cf. id. at 1710. 
 60. ZIEGLER, supra note 3, at 59. Though, they received flak from the movement’s abso-
lutists who would settle for nothing less than an absolute ban on abortion. Id. at 59, 78-84. 
 61. E.g., Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 169 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 62. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47, 856-66, 870 (1992); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Although the Roe 
Court did not preclude founding this right in the Ninth Amendment, the Casey Court fol-
lowed the Roe decision in relying on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
as the source of this right. Casey, 505 U.S. at 847. 
 63. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860, 873, 876. 
 64. Id. at 875-76. 
 65. Id. at 874. 
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sumed the duty of protecting a woman by “justifying abortion re-
strictions on the basis of the physical or psychological harms suppos-
edly produced by the procedure.”66 This opinion undermined the abso-
lutism of Roe, creating an opportunity for legislatures to limit the 
way in which abortions are accessed and conducted.67 Nevertheless, 
Casey’s “undue burden” framework provides the current standard of 
review for abortion legislation.68 
 Rather than focusing on whether a state has justifiably infringed 
upon a constitutional right, the “undue burden” standard focuses on 
whether a statute effectuates a substantial infringement,69 seemingly 
gleaning from a principle that restrictions are acceptable so long as 
the right may still be accessed.70 Regardless of either side’s view on 
the validity of this framework for abortion, the “undue burden” 
framework lends guidance and a sense of uniformity to abortion ju-
risprudence and has for almost twenty-five years. Arguably, the 
standard lends discretion to the court applying it because it is vague-
ly defined and allows courts to tailor individual analyses to specific 
facts.71 Nevertheless, the framework provides at least a roadmap to 
courts for reviewing statutes affecting women’s access to abortion. 
2.   Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt 
 In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the newest case in the 
abortion narrative, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.72 The Hel-
lerstedt Court reviewed Texas House Bill 2 (“HB2”) that, if upheld, 
would have caused more than seventy-five percent of abortion clinics 
                                                                                                                  
 66. Mary Ziegler, Women’s Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern 
Pro-Life Feminism, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 232, 232 (2013) (explaining that 
this argument of harm to the woman receiving an abortion has been adopted and furthered 
by the modern pro-life feminist perspective). But see Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 169-91 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (disputing strongly the argument that women need to be externally 
informed for the decision to have an abortion to psychologically affect them); Roe, 410 U.S. 
at 153 (stating, instead, that the psychological harm arises when a woman is denied access 
to an abortion). 
 67. See Rosenbluth, supra note 17, at 1241. 
 68. See generally, e.g., Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (applying Casey’s “undue  
burden” framework). 
 69. Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis 
in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 870 (1993). 
 70. But cf. id. at 872 (“[T]he potential roots of the ‘undue burden’ standard, remain to 
be unearthed . . . .”). 
 71. E.g., id. at 878; Gillian E. Metzger, Note, Unburdening the Undue Burden Stand-
ard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025, 2027, 2039 
(1994). This was the basis of Justice Scalia’s dissent in Casey. See, e.g., Brownstein, supra 
note 69, at 875-78. 
 72. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). For more information, see generally Lyle Denniston, Court 
to Rule on Abortion Clinic Restrictions, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 13, 2015, 2:32 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/11/court-to-rule-on-abortion-clinic-restrictions/ 
[https://perma.cc/T9BZ-BCV3]. 
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in the State of Texas to close,73 leaving only seven abortion clinics  
in all of Texas.74 Before HB2, Texas had over forty operational  
abortion clinics.75  
 Before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hellerstedt, scholars de-
bated the alternative routes the Court may take in addressing the 
issues presented. Some theorized that abortion returning to the 
Court’s docket would allow the Court to completely overturn the fun-
damental holding in Roe, eliminating the right to choose to have an 
abortion.76 The Court overturning Roe seemed completely unlikely 
considering the Court’s prior emphasis on stare decisis77 and recent 
decisions indicating an interest in following popular opinion and the 
trend of society.78 Though abortion is polarized and a large part of the 
population would prefer the elimination of abortion, some large 
groups strongly oppose the elimination of abortion as a legal right 
and would accuse the Court of a blatant injustice if it were to take 
away a long-standing right. Others speculated that the Court would 
leave intact the right but overturn, or alter, Casey’s “undue burden” 
standard. As expressed by Justice Scalia’s dissent in Casey,79 there 
was ambiguity in the Court’s definition of an “undue burden” that 
allowed for clarification in Hellerstedt.80 
 In fact, the Court did neither and explicitly applied the Casey 
standard, “decid[ing] whether [the statutes at issue] violate[d] the 
Federal Constitution as interpreted in Casey.”81 The Court stated 
                                                                                                                  
 73. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1-2, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 
S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274). 
 74. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2301 (2016) (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 
46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 680 (W.D. Tex. 2014)); see Denniston, supra note 72; Adam Liptak, 
Supreme Court to Hear Texas Abortion Law Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/14/us/politics/supreme-court-accepts-texas-abortion-law-case.html 
[https://perma.cc/QU3Z-4HUS].  
 75. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2301. 
 76. Marcia Coyle, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt: What the Supreme Court is 
Decided in the Most Important Abortion Ruling in Decades (Updated), PBS: INDEPENDENT 
LENS (June 9, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/blog/whole-womans-health-vs-
hellerstedt-what-the-supreme-court-is-deciding-in-most-important-abortion-ruling-in-decades/; 
Christian Farias & Laura Bassett, Supreme Court Hears Historic Case That Could Seal Fate of 
Roe v. Wade, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2016, 11:37 AM), https://www huffingtonpost.com/entry/ 
supreme-court-abortion-rights_us_56d6f857e4b0871f60ed48e6 [https://perma.cc/2DM5-QQXQ].  
 77. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 78. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (finding that the right to 
marriage is fundamental and cannot be denied to same-sex couples). 
 79. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 987-93 (1992)  
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 80. See Denniston, supra note 72; Mary Ziegler, The Supreme Court’s Texas  
Abortion Ruling Reignites a Battle Over Facts, WASH. POST (June 28, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/06/28/the-supreme-courts-texas-
abortion-ruling-reignites-a-battle-over-facts/ [https://perma.cc/3TFH-KZCC]. 
 81. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (emphasis added). 
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that “[t]he rule announced in Casey . . . requires that courts consider 
the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the bene-
fits those laws confer.”82 A close reading of the Hellerstedt opinion 
seems to indicate, at the least: (1) a minimization of deference to the 
legislature in “undue burden” review;83 (2) an increase in the breadth 
of effects that may be considered in an “undue burden” analysis, such 
as the effect on clinics and physicians which translates to an effect on 
patients;84 and (3) a shift towards Roe’s focus on the physician-
patient relationship and viewing abortion as a medical procedure 
similar to others like childbirth or colonoscopies.85 Ultimately, the 
Court struck down HB2 as unconstitutional under Casey’s “undue 
burden” framework.86 
 The doctrinal significance of the Hellerstedt opinion is ambiguous. 
On one hand, Professor Mary Ziegler argues that the Hellerstedt 
opinion contributed rigor to the “undue burden” standard.87 Until 
Hellerstedt, “the court almost never found anything to be unduly 
burdensome.”88 Following Hellerstedt, which “perfectly captures the 
spirit of Casey” by not completely satisfying anyone, Ziegler argues: 
“Those on both sides will have to pull together extensive, persuasive 
and often expensive trial evidence about the effect and purpose of an 
abortion regulation.”89 Ziegler predicts “that we have not seen the 
last of battles about the medical, scientific and sociological evidence 
about abortion, both inside and outside of court.”90 Nevertheless, 
Ziegler contends that Hellerstedt helped clarify what courts may con-
sider when conducting an “undue burden” analysis.91  
 To the contrary, discounting the significance of Hellerstedt, Pro-
fessor Kevin Walsh, for example, argues that Hellerstedt was “a doc-
trinally insignificant but ideologically ominous case in a transitional 
Term.”92 Walsh argues that the opinion brought “proportionality re-
view” to the “undue burden” analysis while allowing the opinions and 
political views of Justices to overpower the law.93 Indicating that the 
                                                                                                                  
 82. Id. at 2309. 
 83. Id. at 2310. 
 84. Id. at 2312. 
 85. Id. at 2315. 
 86. Id. at 2298-99.  
 87. Ziegler, supra note 80. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Kevin Walsh, Symposium: The Constitutional Law of Abortion After Whole Wom-
an’s Health—What Comes Next?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2016, 10:56 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-the-constitutional-law-of-abortion-after-whole- 
womans-health-what-comes-next/ [https://perma.cc/G56V-FPRA]. 
 93. Id. 
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“undue burden” analysis, in fact, was not changed or developed by 
Hellerstedt, Walsh states that the opinion likely reflects “judicial se-
lectivity about which facts matter and why.”94 Even amid the disa-
greement of the significance of Hellerstedt for defining an “undue 
burden” in abortion regulation, it is clear that Casey’s standard  
remains controlling.  
3.   “Undue Burden” Standard Within Abortion 
 Where the “undue burden” standard falls within standard consti-
tutional doctrine is difficult to discern. Doctrinally, the “undue bur-
den” standard is a function of strict scrutiny because it is used to re-
view legislation affecting the fundamental right to access an abor-
tion, which spawns from the fundamental right to privacy guaran-
teed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.95 
However, in application, the “undue burden” standard vacillates be-
tween intermediate and strict scrutiny. Before Hellerstedt, the only 
law that the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated by applying the “undue 
burden” standard was the spousal consent provision reviewed in Ca-
sey.96 The four other provisions at issue in Casey and the Partial-
Birth Abortion Act, which the Court reviewed in Gonzales v. Car-
hart,97 were upheld as constitutional under this standard, indicating 
something less than strict scrutiny because these laws would likely 
have been stricken under a rigid strict-scrutiny analysis.98  
 In Hellerstedt, the Court seemingly heightened the rigidity of the 
“undue burden” standard, or gave it more teeth, by invalidating Tex-
as’s HB2 in its entirety under the “undue burden” standard.99 The 
Court clearly indicated that the appropriate review of abortion legis-
lation is more rigorous than rational basis review, which is “applica-
ble where, for example, economic legislation is at issue.”100 To this 
effect, Justice Thomas states in his dissent: 
                                                                                                                  
 94. Id. 
 95. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 762-64 (1997). 
 96. See Ziegler, supra note 80. 
 97. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 98. See Ziegler, supra note 80. 
 99. See id.; Mary Ziegler, Symposium: The Court Once Again Makes the “Undue-
Burden” Test a Referendum on the Facts, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2016, 2:34 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-the-court-once-again-makes-the-undue-burden- 
test-a-referendum-on-the-facts/ [https://perma.cc/D22V-NSML].  
 100. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016). 
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The majority’s undue-burden test looks far less like our post-
Casey precedents and far more like the strict-scrutiny standard that 
Casey rejected, under which only the most compelling rationales 
justified restrictions on abortion. One searches the majority opinion 
in vain for any acknowledgement of the “premise central” to Casey’s 
rejection of strict scrutiny: “that the government has a legitimate 
and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life” from 
conception, not just in regulating medical procedures.101 
Signaling something less than strict scrutiny, though, Justice Brey-
er’s majority states the Court’s holding: “We conclude that neither of 
these provisions confers medical benefits sufficient to justify the bur-
dens upon access that each imposes.”102 Referring to the “legitimate” 
interests recognized in Roe and the “valid” interests discussed in Ca-
sey, it seems that even with the added rigor, “undue burden” is prac-
tically something less than strict scrutiny. 
 Due to the invasiveness, privacy, intimacy, and health implica-
tions of an abortion procedure, the undue burden standard may not 
be appropriate for the abortion context, as it may exclude considera-
tion of several of these concerns that were emphasized in Roe. Re-
gardless, the Court did not use its recent opportunity in Hellerstedt 
to overturn or change the governing abortion framework. And, the 
standard’s underlying logic translates well to other individual consti-
tutional contexts, such as the Second Amendment. The next Part ex-
plains the presence that firearms currently hold in America and the 
legal frameworks within which they are protected and regulated. 
III.   FIREARMS CURRENTLY IN THE UNITED STATES 
 Ten years before Roe, firearms were brought to the forefront of 
political discussion when John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dal-
las, Texas.103 One author argued that this was the turning point at 
which politics began to focus on the weapon as the problem rather 
than the individual committing the crime.104 Whatever the cause, 
America has become increasingly polarized on both abortion and gun 
control for the past fifty years. 
 “[C]rime, particularly crime involving drugs and guns, is a perva-
sive, nationwide problem . . . .”105 Second Amendment restrictions are 
an ongoing nationwide debate and were at the forefront of discussion 
                                                                                                                  
 101. Id. at 2326 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 145). 
 102. Id. at 2300 (majority opinion). 
 103. ROBERT J. KUKLA, GUN CONTROL 19-20 (1973). 
 104. Id. at 20-21. 
 105. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (2012). 
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during the 2016 presidential election.106 Conservative political candi-
dates promised to broaden citizens’ rights to access firearms107 while 
liberal candidates prioritized increasing regulations on gun owner-
ship under the Second Amendment.108 This Part canvasses the consti-
tutional framework that provides the fundamental right to bear 
arms, explains current (federal and state) statutory controls on ac-
cessing firearms, and describes the gun-related violence that has 
shaken America in recent years. Seemingly, pioneers of the discus-
sion are minimally limited in possible arguments because no stand-
ing framework exists under which gun safety legislation is reviewed. 
Thus, defining the Second Amendment and its protections is the rhe-
torical focus, rather than what restrictions should be allowed within 
established boundaries. 
A.   Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
 The Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states:  
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be  
infringed.109  
Unlike the right to abortion, which is a liberty interest found within 
the unenumerated rights of protected “liberty” within the Due Pro-
cess Clause,110 the right to bear arms is enumerated within the Bill of 
Rights.111 Firearms are used for a myriad of purposes in the United 
States, including self-defense,112 recreation,113 and law enforcement.114 
                                                                                                                  
 106. See Justin McCarthy, Quarter of U.S. Voters Say Candidate Must Share View on 
Guns, GALLUP (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/186248/quarter-voters-say-candidate-
share-view-guns.aspx?g_source=gun%20violence&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles  
[https://perma.cc/CPU9-V6FY] (reporting that fifty-four percent of Americans say that gun 
control is at least one issue that affect their presidential vote). 
 107. See Gun Control, ON THE ISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.org/Gun_Control.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Q4CP-MXFF]. 
 108. See id. 
 109. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 110. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (grounding the right to abortion in 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 111. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 112. Cf. KUKLA, supra note 103, at 438 (using offensive and illustrious language to 
express the self-defense purpose of handguns). 
 113. Id. at 18-19 (arguing that the general ability to use guns recreationally is part of 
what demarcated America from England). 
 114. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 790.051 (2017) (exempting law enforcement officers from “the 
licensing and penal provisions” for gun ownership and use while acting “within the scope or 
course of their official duties”); see also, Amanda Sakuma, Taser vs. Gun: Why Police 
Choose Deadly Force Despite Non-Lethal Options, NBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016, 7:16 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/taser-vs-gun-why-police-choose-deadly-force-
despite-non-n656461 [https://perma.cc/LU9R-R8JC] (discussing the training of law en-
forcement officers on the use of firearms in dangerous situations rather than other non-
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Conservatives, embodied by the National Rifle Association (“NRA”),115 
argue that Americans are constitutionally entitled to privately own 
firearms in any form and that the government cannot restrict that 
Second Amendment right whatsoever.116 Liberals are more inclined to 
enact legislation that provides infrastructure to control its adverse 
effects on American society.117  
 Like abortion, the Second Amendment has several times been con-
templated by the U.S. Supreme Court. In District of Columbia v. Hel-
ler,118 the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Second Amend-
ment is an individual federal right, rather than focused only on “en-
sur[ing] the effectiveness of the [national] military,” as the text may 
suggest.119 Heller was the first time that the Court invalidated a feder-
al firearms statute under the Second Amendment;120 and, it estab-
lished that “the right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose 
of self-defense” is included in the Second Amendment’s protections.121  
 Then, in McDonald v. Chicago, the U.S. Supreme Court selectively 
incorporated the Second Amendment to the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, extending the Amendment’s protections 
to the States, thus requiring State regulations to conform to federal 
constitutional standards.122 Despite the seemingly straight-forward 
doctrine from Heller and McDonald, it is anything but clear how the 
U.S. Supreme Court will review Second Amendment legislation in 
the future.123 The McDonald decision signaled to the states that the 
                                                                                                                  
lethal weapons); Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-277, 118 
Stat. 865 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B-926C (2012)) (authorizing qualified 
police officers and qualified retired officers certified in any state to carry a concealed fire-
arm in any jurisdiction in the United States even where doing so conflicts with local laws). 
 115. See A Brief History of the NRA, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N, https://home.nra.org/about-
the-nra/ [https://perma.cc/WM7X-SRYE]; see also Hardy, supra note 2, at 48 (stating that 
the NRA relies primarily on funding from its members to operate); id. at 48-49 (discussing 
how the media affects the NRA’s membership recruiting and lobbying efforts). See general-
ly KUKLA, supra note 103 (edited by the then-President of the NRA). 
 116. ALEX ALVAREZ & RONET BACHMAN, VIOLENCE: THE ENDURING PROBLEM 61 (2d ed. 2012). 
 117. Cf. KUKLA, supra note 103, at 21. 
 118. 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (striking down D.C.’s handgun ban), overruling United States 
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). But cf. Nelson Lund, Heller and Second Amendment Prece-
dent, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 336-39 (2009). 
 119. Second Amendment, LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL U. L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
wex/second_amendment [https://perma.cc/79P5-L46D]; accord Lund, supra note 118, at 336. 
 120. E.g., TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 155; Lund, supra note 118, at 335. 
 121. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (citing Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)) (striking down Chicago’s handgun ban); accord Lund, supra 
note 118, at 336. 
 122. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750. As a matter of safety, gun control is generally a mat-
ter of state jurisdiction under the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. 
CONST. amend. X. 
 123. Cf. Lund, supra note 118, at 339-40 (explaining the irreconcilability between Mil-
ler, 307 U.S. 174, and Heller, 554 U.S. 570). See generally Calvin Massey, Second Amend-
ment Decision Rules, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1431 (2008). 
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U.S. Supreme Court viewed narrowly what is allowable as gun con-
trol legislation.124 “Heller and McDonald now anchor an evolving body 
of constitutional law that safeguards gun rights.”125 
B.   Current Statutory Controls 
 Despite the Court’s reluctance to uphold Second Amendment re-
strictions,126 firearm regulations remain within state and federal leg-
islation.127 First, federal firearm legislation is limited to areas of fed-
eral jurisdiction within the U.S. Constitution,128 such as interstate 
commerce.129 Federal firearm restrictions seem to be an attempt by 
Congress to supplement state efforts since Congress found that 
“States, localities, and school systems find it almost impossible to 
handle gun-related crime by themselves . . . .”130 This Section summa-
rizes current federal and state statutory gun controls. 
1.   Federal Legislation 
 The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 (the “Brady 
Act”) was the most expansive federal gun control legislation.131 The 
Brady Act “require[d, among other provisions,] federally licensed 
firearms dealers [ ] to perform background checks” on persons seek-
ing to purchase a firearm to ensure the purchase is legal.132 The 
Brady Act established the National Instant Criminal Background 
Check System (“NICS”) to conduct the required background checks 
when one purchases a firearm.133 Current federal statutes, though, 
allow firearm purchases to proceed anyway if the background check 
process is not complete, or has not raised any warning, after three 
days.134 In other words, if a required background check takes more 
than three days for any reason, the requirement is nullified, and the 
purchase proceeds without the results. This three-day release is 
                                                                                                                  
 124. See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 155. See generally McDonald, 561 U.S. 742.  
 125. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 155. 
 126. See generally id.  
 127. See, e.g., infra notes 142-49 and accompanying text. 
 128. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 129. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(e), (g)-(i), (k), (n), (q)(B)-(D), (G), (I) (2012); id. § 924 (establish-
ing, among others, punishment for involving firearms related to felonies in interstate 
commerce); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 3. 
 130. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(H) (2012). 
 131. Federal Law on Background Checks, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE 
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 922), http://smartgunlaws.org/federal-law-on-background-checks/  
(last visited Sept. 9, 2016). 
 132. Id. 
 133. For more on the NICS process, see id.  
 134. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1)); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE 
PROCEDURES RELATED TO FIREARM SALES, 2005 (Nov. 2006), https://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/ssprfs05.pdf [https://perma.cc/VY57-LHUA]. 
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known as a “default proceed.”135 The NICS, with the “default pro-
ceed,” still exists as the entity that conducts background checks for 
firearm purchases when required. But, not only does this require-
ment have a narrow time-frame, it does not encompass all gun sales 
in the United States. The NICS only applies to licensed firearm 
sellers, excusing approximately forty percent of gun purchases from 
this screening requirement,136 including purchases made at gun 
shows.137 Thus, federal background checks are conducted when they 
take less than three days on qualifying purchases. 
 Also limiting the Brady Act’s reach, the Act applied only to hand-
guns. In 1989, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explo-
sives identified forty-three types of assault weapons, which were not 
affected by the Brady Act.138 Assault weapons are semiautomatic, 
meaning once the trigger is depressed and the gun fires, a new bullet 
is automatically reloaded.139 Though assault weapons account for a 
small part of the entire population of guns in America, they are ubiq-
uitous among mass shooters.140 In 1994, the Assault Weapons Ban 
(“AWB”) was enacted to ban nineteen types of assault weapons.141 In 
September 2004, the new Congress, which had been strongly lobbied 
by the NRA, allowed the AWB to expire, so civilians could once again 
access assault weapons.142 
 Further, federal firearm restrictions prohibit certain individuals from 
possessing firearms. These individuals are listed in 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) 
and include those who have been charged with or convicted of a felo-
                                                                                                                  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. (citing Closing Illegal Gun Markets: Extending Criminal Background Checks 
to All Gun Sales, EDUC. FUND TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE (May 2002)). 
 137. See WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: NEW EXECUTIVE ACTIONS TO REDUCE GUN 
VIOLENCE AND MAKE OUR COMMUNITIES SAFER (Jan. 4, 2016) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE 
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 140. See id. at 496; Lois Beckett, The Assault Weapon Myth, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/sunday-review/the-assault-weapon-myth.html 
[https://perma.cc/98UJ-Q69D]; Larry Buchanan, et al., How They Got Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 7, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/03/us/how-mass-shooters-got-their-
guns.html [https://perma.cc/7DWP-DKSC]; see also Abrams, supra note 138, at 494 (citing 
Jim Stewart & Andrew Alexander, Assault Weapons Muscling in on the Front Lines of 
Crime, ATLANTA J. & CONST., at A1 (May 21, 1989) (discussing a 1989 report that found 
that an assault weapon is twenty times more likely to be used in a crime than a conven-
tional weapon)); id. at 495-96. 
 141. ALVAREZ & BACHMAN, supra note 116, at 60-61. 
 142. Id. at 61. 
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ny,143 are fugitives from justice,144 are using or addicted to illegal sub-
stances,145 or have been determined mentally incapacitated.146 The 
same statute further reflects a significant concern for perpetrators of 
domestic violence and restricts anyone who is restrained by the court 
from “harassing, stalking, or threatening [his or her] intimate part-
ner . . . or child”147 or who has been convicted of any domestic violence 
crime.148 Other statutory concerns include tampering with a weapon 
or the sale/transfer of stolen weapons.149 Federal statutes are bound 
by congressional jurisdictional limits emanating from the Constitu-
tion, leaving a majority of gun control issues within the prerogative 
of states’ police powers.150 Thus, states individually enact legislation 
governing firearms in their jurisdiction. Nationwide state legislation 
is outlined in Subsection 3 below after President Obama’s 2016 Ex-
ecutive Order relating to firearms is explained in Section 2 below. 
2.   2016 Executive Order 
 The lack of interpretation of the Second Amendment and resulting 
absence of applicable framework leaves a wide-range of gaps to be 
filled by any governmental branch. Recognizing the prevalence of gun 
violence in the United States and a glaring need for reform in gun 
control, President Obama released a relevant Executive Order in ear-
ly 2016.151 The Executive Order, by reinterpreting current legislation, 
attempted to improve the NICS background process by extending the 
time in which background checks are processed, expanding the scope 
of the background requirement, and hiring over 200 additional “ex-
aminers and other staff to help process these background checks.”152 
Similarly, the Executive Order provides that funding will be provided 
for additional law enforcement officers to enforce gun laws.153 Fur-
ther, the Order directs governmental departments to conduct or en-
dorse research on gun safety and related technology.154 President 
Obama’s Executive Order—whether a constitutional use of power or 
                                                                                                                  
 143. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (2012). 
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not155—further demonstrates the vacuum of Second Amendment 
guidance from jurisprudence, leaving the legislative and executive 
branches to individually fill in gaps as they see fit, taking into con-
sideration interests of their constituents and interest groups.  
3.   State Legislation 
 With respect to gun control, each state acts as a sovereign entity 
in crafting legislation, so gun control legislation varies significantly 
between states.156 “State gun laws fill enormous gaps that exist in our 
nation’s federal laws, and help to reduce gun violence and keep citi-
zens safe.”157 In 2015, California was the state with the “strongest 
gun reform measures in the country,” followed by Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York, respec-
tively.158 Those on the other end of the spectrum with the least 
amount of gun control legislation were Arizona, Alaska, Kansas, Mis-
sissippi, and Wyoming.159 In 2016, California was again ranked first 
in gun safety, followed by Connecticut, New Jersey, Massachusetts, 
Maryland, New York, and Hawaii, respectively.160 
 A state’s rank in protective measures, which considers the amount 
of state gun control legislation, seems to be reflected in their respec-
tive gun violence rates.161 For example, in 2015, California and Con-
necticut ranked forty-two and forty-seven, respectively, in “Gun 
Death Rate Rank,” and Mississippi and Wyoming ranked three and 
                                                                                                                  
 155. See Motion for Summary Judgment, Klayman v. Obama, No. 9:16-cv- 
80087-DMM (S.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.freedomwatchusa.org/pdf/160203-
MotionforSummaryJudgmentASFILED.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S7E-C6LC]. 
 156. E.g., 2013 State Scorecard, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
http://www.bradycampaign.org/2013-state-scorecard?gclid=CMicjKmogcoCFYcWHwod5HQDOQ 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2016). 
 157. Id.  
 158. Press Release, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, One Year After New-
town, States Lead the Way on Gun Violence Prevention According to New Analysis of 
State Gun Laws (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.bradycampaign.org/inthenews/one-year-after-newtown-
states-lead-the-way-on-gun-violence-prevention-according-to-new [https://perma.cc/PEE3-MYSY]; 
accord LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 2015 GUN LAW STATE SCORECARD (2015), 
http://gunlawscorecard.org/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).  
 159. Press Release, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, supra note 158; LAW 
CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 158. 
 160. 2016 Gun Law State Scorecard, GUN LAW SCORECARD, http://gunlawscorecard.org/ 
 [https://perma.cc/UVD4-H7WH].  
 161. Press Release, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, supra note 158 
(“[M]any of [these States] also have some of the highest gun death rates in the coun-
try.”); LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 158; see Guns in America Town 
Hall with Obama Transcript (Full Text), CNN (Jan. 7, 2016, 11:00 PM) [hereinafter 
Guns in America Transcript], http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/07/politics/transcript-obama-
town-hall-guns-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/S62X-GCT8] (“[I]f you look at where are the 
areas with the highest gun ownership, those are the places . . . where the crime rate 
hasn’t dropped down that much. And the places where there’s pretty stiff restrictions on 
gun ownership, . . . the crime has dropped really quickly.”). 
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seven, respectively.162 In 2016, California ranked forty-three and 
Connecticut ranked forty-six. Massachusetts ranked last (fifty).163 
These states will guide the legislation summary in this discussion  
to describe the most protective and least restrictive examples in  
the country. 
 California, the most proactive state in the nation on gun control, 
seems to have built upon federal restrictions to ensure that the most 
protective means are in place. For example, although the federal 
AWB expired in 2004, California bans civilians completely from pos-
sessing, selling, or obtaining any assault weapon.164 California also 
imposes further implications for illegal possession of firearms where-
by illegal firearms—considered a public nuisance—are confiscated 
and destroyed.165 California is an example of a state using its Tenth 
Amendment police powers to safeguard its citizens from firearms be-
yond the protections provided by federal laws.166 
 By contrast, Wyoming has an individualized constitutional provi-
sion that is broader than the U.S. Constitution, which provides:  
The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and 
of the state shall not be denied.167  
Wyoming does not require that purchasers possess a permit or li-
cense to obtain a firearm, and sellers err on the side of granting the 
purchase.168 There is no state law prohibiting the possession of ma-
chine guns, or assault weapons.169 Thus, federal restrictions seem to 
act as the outermost limits on the sale and possession of firearms in 
                                                                                                                  
 162. LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 158. 
 163. 2016 Gun Law State Scorecard, supra note 160.  
 164. CAL. PENAL CODE § 30515 (Deering 2015), Note § 12 (“It is the purpose of this 
act to effectively achieve the Legislature’s intent to prohibit all assault weapons.”); CAL. 
PENAL CODE §§ 30600-15 (Deering 2015); Assault Weapons in California, LAW CTR.  
TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://smartgunlaws.org/assault-weapons-in-california/  
[https://perma.cc/8MSP-Z2K8]; see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 30510, 30515 (Deering 2015) (de-
fining further “assault weapon”); Jones & Frosch, infra note 279. There is an exception to 
the California assault weapon ban for law enforcement agencies, when necessary. See CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 30630 (Deering 2015). 
 165. Assault Weapons in California, supra note 164 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 30800(a), 
(c) (Deering 2015)). 
 166. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; CAL. PENAL CODE § 30505(a) (Deering 2015). 
 167. WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 24 (emphasis added); Wyoming State Profile, NRA-ILA (Nov. 
12, 2014) (emphasis added), https://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/state-gun-laws/wyoming/.  
 168. Wyoming Gun Laws, NRA-ILA (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/ 
state-gun-laws/wyoming/ [https://perma.cc/QK72-YAAQ?type=image].  
 169. Id. In fact, Wyoming lawmakers have even sought to oust federal restrictions on 
assault weapons. See Charlie Spiering, Wyoming Lawmakers Propose Bill to Nullify 
New Federal Gun Laws, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 10, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/wyoming-lawmakers-propose-bill-to-nullify-new-
federal-gun-laws/article/2518133 [https://perma.cc/5REF-KYM6]. 
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Wyoming.170 In other words, Wyoming does not further affect fire-
arms in the state, deferring to federal restrictions for the ceiling  
of restriction.171  
C.   Recent Gun Violence in the United States 
 Regrettably, shootings have become all-too-familiar in American 
life. Random acts of violence have taken many American lives in re-
cent years. This Section details a few, significant public shootings  
in recent years to highlight the effect firearms have on modern  
U.S. society. 
 Just one example of a seemingly non-pointed, or random, shooting 
was in October of 2017 when Stephen Paddock, sixty-four years old, 
“rained a rapid-fire barrage on an outdoor concert festival” in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, from his hotel room on the 34th floor of a nearby ho-
tel.172 The attack left at least 59 dead and 527 others injured, making 
it the deadliest mass shooting in modern U.S. history.173 Five years 
earlier, in June 2012, James Holmes, twenty years-old, ambushed a 
movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, during a midnight showing of the 
newly released The Dark Knight Rises.174 He was suited in armor  
and wearing a mask.175 Twelve were fatally wounded in the sudden  
mass shooting.176 
 School shootings seem to be a particular gun violence issue that 
both terrifies Americans and polarizes the gun debate. “[T]he number 
of school killings in the U.S. between 2000 and 2010 was one less 
than the number in dozens of other countries combined,” including 
Canada, China, England, France, India, Israel, Japan, Russia, Thai-
land, and Yemen.177 One of the most significant in recent times was 
December 14, 2012, when the country was shaken by a shooting that 
                                                                                                                  
 170. See Wyoming Gun Laws, supra note 167. But see Spiering, supra note 169 (ex-
plaining Wyoming lawmakers’ pushback on federal firearm restrictions). 
 171. Wyoming Gun Laws, supra note 167. 
 172. Multiple Weapons Found in Las Vegas Gunman’s Hotel Room, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/us/las-vegas-shooting.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/YD97-4LLE]. 
 173. Id.; Las Vegas Shooting: What We Know, CNN (Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2017/10/02/us/las-vegas-shooting-what-we-know/index.html [https://perma.cc/BGB7-DTKY]. 
 174. E.g., TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 154. 
 175. E.g., id. 
 176. E.g., id. 
 177. Justin McCarthy, Three in 10 U.S. Parents Worry About Child’s Safety at School, 
GALLUP (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/184853/three-parents-worry-child-
safety-school.aspx?g_source=gun%20violence&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles 
[https://perma.cc/LL29-BG9T]; Simone Foxman, How School Killings in the US Stack Up 
Against 36 Other Countries Put Together, QUARTZ (Dec. 14, 2012), 
http://qz.com/37015/how-school-killings-in-the-us-stack-up-against-36-other-countries-put-
together/ [https://perma.cc/728Q-7J7G]; accord Guns in the US, supra note 5 (reporting 
sixty-four school shootings in 2015 alone).  
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invaded what is supposed to be one of the safest and most innocent 
places in everyday life: an elementary school.178 Adam Lanza, a twen-
ty-year-old, took his mother’s semi-automatic rifles to Sandy Hook 
Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, and opened fire.179 
Twenty children and six adult staff members lost their lives on that 
day.180 In addition to the Sandy Hook massacre, there have been mul-
tiple shootings at U.S. colleges and universities in recent years, in-
cluding Florida State University in 2014 (three wounded and shooter 
killed)181 and Virginia Tech in 2007 (thirty-three deaths including the 
shooter and twenty-three wounded).182 With the rise in violence and 
resulting fear in American schools, school shootings are now a real 
concern for school officials.183 This sampling of information on recent 
school shootings in the United States shows that guns are a real 
threat to schools and a relied upon instrument for attackers. And, 
more significantly, the prevalence of gun violence in schools is dis-
turbing U.S. education systems. 
 Just after the Sandy Hook tragedy, thirty-three percent of U.S. 
parents were concerned for their child’s safety at school.184 In 2015, 
twenty-nine percent of U.S. parents retained that fear.185 The shoot-
ing seemed to spark the most recent, polarized iteration of America’s 
gun debate.186 Gun rights activists, spearheaded by the NRA, re-
sponded with a push for increased guns in schools.187 They argue that 
                                                                                                                  
 178. WALSH & HEMMENS, supra note 7, at 373. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. This does not include the shooter’s mother who he shot in her bed before the 
attack and the shooter himself who committed suicide when police arrived at the school. Id. 
 181. E.g., Sean Rossman, Shooting at Strozier Library Stuns Florida State, 
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Nov. 21, 2014, 10:15 AM), http://www.tallahassee.com/ 
story/news/local/fsu-news/2014/11/20/shooting-strozier-library-stuns-florida-state/70040320/ 
[https://perma.cc/UV6U-P3ZQ]. Note that this technically falls outside of the definition of 
“mass shooting.” See supra note 5. 
 182. Christine Hauser & Anahad O’Conner, Virginia Tech Shooting Leaves 33 Dead, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/16/us/16cnd-shooting.html 
[https://perma.cc/9JQP-W6W7]. 
 183. In late 2015, school officials in Los Angeles received a threat and, in an abundance 
of caution, closed the entire district until the threat could be investigated and cleared. Alex 
Dobuzinskis & Dan Whitcomb, Gun and Bomb Attack Threat Closes Los Angeles Schools 
in Likely Hoax, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2015, 6:09 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-los-
angeles-threat-idUSKBN0TY1YR20151215 [https://perma.cc/2CBF-S7C9]; see Greg Bo-
telho, One Threat to L.A. and New York School Districts, Two Very Different Responses, 
CNN (Dec. 15, 2015, 4:21 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/15/us/la-new-york-school-threats/ 
[https://perma.cc/4QG8-R46L] (discussing a similar threat in New York). 
 184. McCarthy, supra note 177. 
 185. Id. 
 186. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 156-58; WALSH & HEMMENS, supra note 7, at 384; 
McCarthy, supra note 177; see Press Release, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, 
supra note 158. 
 187. See Christina Wilkie, NRA School Safety Report Recommends Arming Teachers, 
Loosening Gun Laws (UPDATE), HUFFINGTON POST: POL. (Apr. 2, 2013, 1:33 PM), 
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increasing the amount of firearms will lessen the amount of violence 
due to the equality of power on both sides of an attack.188 By their 
logic, if teachers (or other school authorities)189 are armed, then 
school shootings are less likely to occur because shooters will know 
they will be met with reciprocal power.190 On the other side, propo-
nents of increased gun control argue that further restricting access to 
firearms will lessen the prevalence of senseless violence in America 
because such restrictions will help ensure that only responsible car-
riers are allowed to handle such deadly weapons. Or, they counter 
the gun rights activists’ proposal by suggesting that an increased 
likelihood of injuries or deaths will follow from the increased pres-
ence of firearms in schools.191 
 Similar to the political polarization that resulted from the Sandy 
Hook attack, shootings seem to have taken the tenor of political 
statements. In late 2015, Robert Dear attacked a Planned 
Parenthood clinic in Colorado Springs, Colorado.192 Three were killed, 
including one Colorado Springs police officer, and several others were 
injured.193 After a several-hour stand-off with police, Dear was finally 
apprehended by police and interrogated.194 During questioning, Dear 
“mentioned ‘baby parts’ . . . [and] expressed anti-abortion and anti-
government views.”195 Though Dear’s motive has not been confirmed 
                                                                                                                  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/02/nra-school-safety-report_n_2999968.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZZ4T-KRSP]. 
 188. See, e.g., Eugene Scott, Trump: Armed Teachers Could Have Stopped Oregon 
Massacre, CNN (Oct. 4, 2015, 9:20 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/03/politics/donald-
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 189. See Ashley Fantz, NRA Clarifies Its Stance on Arming Schools, CNN (Dec. 27, 2012, 5:03 
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 190. A flaw in this argument is that a large amount of attackers are not deterred by a 
fear of firearms, as they have suicidal intentions. See, e.g., Scott A. Bonn, The Suicide-
Mass Murder Connection: A Growing Epidemic, PSYCHOL. TODAY: WICKED DEEDS  
(Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/wicked-deeds/201503/the-suicide-
mass-murder-connection-growing-epidemic [https://perma.cc/ULQ2-TNQC]; Adam Lank-
ford, Opinion, What Drives Suicidal Mass Killers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/opinion/what-drives-suicidal-mass-killers.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/XT3M-QV5W]. 
 191. Fantz, supra note 189. 
 192. Kevin Conlon et al., Source: Suspect Spoke of ‘Baby Parts’ After Planned 
Parenthood Shooting, CNN (Nov. 29, 2015, 1:23 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/ 
11/28/us/colorado-planned-parenthood-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/CL6N-CDAB]. The 
shooter’s background included domestic violence accusations, reasonably raising questions 
as to how he obtained his firearm. Id. 
 193. Id.; Ben Markus, Suspect in Colorado Planned Parenthood Shooting Appears in 
Court, NPR (Nov. 30, 2015, 5:19 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/30/457907203/suspect-in-
colorado-planned-parenthood-shooting-appears-in-court [https://perma.cc/3M7Y-9P6N]. 
 194. See Conlon et al., supra note 192. 
 195. Id. 
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by authorities,196 the U.S. Attorney General and the President  
of Planned Parenthood characterized the shooting as a “crime  
against women.”197  
 In mid-2016, Omar Mateen, a former security guard, opened fire in 
an Orlando nightclub most frequented by homosexual patrons.198 Ma-
teen used a nine-millimeter semi-automatic handgun and a .223-
caliber assault-style rifle, killing forty-nine and wounding at least fifty 
more.199 “Mateen bought the guns he used in the massacre . . . a few 
days before the assault. He did not need a security guard’s license to 
buy them.”200 Mateen’s father remembered Mateen being “angered by 
the sight of two men kissing during a trip to Miami.”201 The Pulse 
shooting was the deadliest mass shooting in U.S. history at the time.202  
 In July 2016, the execution of Dallas police officers came as a po-
litical response to racial tension between police officers and citi-
zens.203 Micah Johnson, expressly angry at “white people” and “white 
[police] officers,” used a rifle from an elevated position to execute po-
lice officers in the streets of Dallas during a peaceful protest follow-
ing the death of two black citizens by white police officers.204 The Dal-
las shooting produced the deadliest day for law enforcement since 
September 11, 2001—two records of lethality by firearms broken in 
the United States in a matter of one month.205  
 Guns being at the center of political debates now heighten the 
concern of firearms being used to make a statement. “For the crazed 
gunman, . . . the question is how to prevent such carnage . . . . An-
swering that question requires a close examination of the system of 
laws that govern gun ownership, particularly limits on who can pur-
                                                                                                                  
 196. See Markus, supra note 193. 
 197. Conlon et al., supra note 192. 
 198. Rene Stutzman, Orlando Gunman: ‘He Was an Expert Marksman,’ Says His For-
mer Gun Range Instructor, ORLANDO SENTINEL (June 22, 2016, 5:24 PM), 
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 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Maya Rhodan, What We Know About Pulse Nightclub, Site of the Deadly Orlando 
Shooting, TIME (June 12, 2016), http://time.com/4365362/pulse-night-orlando-shooting/ 
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 204. Nicole Gaouette & Steve Visser, Dallas Police Shooter a Reclusive Army Reservist, 
CNN (July 11, 2016, 2:59 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/08/us/micah-xavier-johnson-
dallas-shooter/ [https://perma.cc/HT2D-E2AT]; Karimi, Shoichet & Ellis, supra note 203. 
 205. Karimi, Shoichet & Ellis, supra note 203. 
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chase guns and how much firepower they can obtain.”206 The attacks 
by Dear, Mateen, and Johnson show that guns are the weapons of 
choice for “domestic terrorists” seeking to make political statements 
in the United States. 
IV.   CONVERGING THE TWO: APPLYING THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD 
TO SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
 “The possession of a handgun greatly increases the possibility that 
you or someone you love will be killed with or as a result of that 
weapon.”207 Most of the weapons used in recent mass shootings were 
purchased legally and involved NICS background processing.208 At 
least eight of those shooters had criminal backgrounds or mental 
health histories that slipped through current controls, allowing their 
purchases to go through.209 This Part converges the arguments and 
reasoning surrounding gun control and abortion restrictions, demon-
strating that the differences between the two areas are slighter than 
they initially appear, and the framework from the latter may tre-
mendously aid in reviewing legislation on the former. This Part, 
framed by the “undue burden” analysis from Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey210 and Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt,211 applies the “undue burden” standard to progressive 
gun control legislation, contending that such provisions—inquiring 
into the purchaser’s mental health, eliminating the “default proceed,” 
and reinstating a ban on assault weapons—could pass constitutional 
muster under this framework. 
 Opponents of gun control argue that proponents are too idealistic 
to realize that any legitimate restrictions will only create an envi-
ronment where the only gun owners are those whom the laws seek to 
prohibit from owning firearms.212 This is because those who should 
not own guns would be the ones willing to defy the legislation, or 
break the law, and wrongly retain their firearms.213 Regardless of 
partisan controversy, the facts underlying recent gun violence in the 
United States show the insufficiency of current gun control laws.214 
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Aside from the narrowly construed Supreme Court Second Amend-
ment jurisprudence, there is little guidance as to how Second 
Amendment violations are reviewed.215 In other words, courts are in 
need of a workable standard for reviewing gun control legislation, 
especially in the wake of recent gun violence in the United States. 
 Considering the political influence of the legislative and executive 
branches, the judiciary—a theoretically politics-free branch—seems 
to be the appropriate avenue for instituting guidance in Second 
Amendment review. Turning to the abortion framework for guidance, 
the “undue burden” standard may be imperfect, but, it will undoubt-
edly help to provide a needed infrastructure to review gun control 
legislation under the Second Amendment, which is presently glaring-
ly absent from case law. 
 Introducing its Roe v. Wade opinion, the Court stated: 
One’s philosophy, one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the raw edg-
es of human existence, one’s religious training, one’s attitudes to-
ward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one 
establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to 
color one’s thinking and conclusions about abortion.216 
In other words, abortion is a very personal and political topic. Note, 
though, how easily this entire statement can be transposed to gun 
control by exchanging just the last term in the Court’s statement, i.e. 
“. . . conclusions about gun control.” “As with other controversial is-
sues such as abortion and affirmative action, opinions about gun con-
trol are almost always passionately held and in diametric opposi-
tion.”217 Both issues, though privately guided by emotion and diverse 
personal views,218 have constitutional overtones that invoke various 
degrees of governmental interests and allowable restrictions.219 
 Despite appealing to opposing partisanship and rarely sharing 
conversation, the right to abortion and the right to bear arms are 
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substantially similar in their existence and controlling framework.220 
Both are fundamental within the U.S. Constitution.221 Both are “indi-
vidual” rights, meaning they belong to the individual seeking to exer-
cise them;222 yet, both rights affect others surrounding the one exer-
cising the right.223 Feminists and abortion activists may disagree and 
argue that abortion is a decision solely between the woman and her 
physician. But, there is an argument that, at least in some situations 
where others are privy to information about the woman’s decision, 
others are affected by abortions. For gun control, the connection is 
much simpler, as the victim and a countless number of those close to 
the victim are affected when a firearm is discharged unlawfully. In 
fact, the general public is affected by gun control laws—whether 
broadened or narrowed—at least to the extent that they affect the 
society in which they live.224 
 Proponents of firearm deregulation hold beliefs that mirror the 
pro-life incrementalism strategy.225 Supporters of an unrestricted 
Second Amendment fear that each gun control law that passes is a 
step towards a total ban on their cherished weapons. David Hardy 
argues that their fear of any gun-control measures is reasonable be-
cause “[t]hey have heard opponents describe their purpose to elimi-
nate handgun ownership, with any lesser measures simply a means 
to that end.”226 So, Hardy argues, “opposition even to modest re-
strictions is both logical and natural.”227 Yet, on the abortion side of 
the same coin, pro-lifers (whom likely intermingle with gun propo-
nents, if not individually, then systemically as they may identify with 
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Tom Dart, Open Carry of Handguns in Texas: Fear for Some But ‘Everybody Else Is Pack-
ing’, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 1, 2016, 10:46 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/jan/01/texas-open-carry-handguns-law-public-places-businesses 
[https://perma.cc/LJC3-W7RE] (discussing the antiquated atmosphere open-carry gun con-
trol legislation would create); Jim Turner, Florida’s Campus-Carry Bill Likely Holstered, 
NEWS SERVICE OF FLA. (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.wuft.org/news/2016/01/21/floridas-
campus-carry-bill-likely-holstered/ [https://perma.cc/Q57A-HDHL] (stating that open-carry 
legislation is being considered in Florida). 
 225. See Hardy, supra note 2, at 49-50; supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text. See 
generally Hardy, supra note 2. 
 226. Hardy, supra note 2, at 49-50. 
 227. Id. at 50; see also Data and Statistics: Abortion, supra note 15. 
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the same political party) use this exact strategy that they harshly 
reject for gun control to restrict abortion rights.228 
 Applying the argument that the Second Amendment should be 
completely unrestricted to abortion results in this: The right to have 
an abortion is a fundamental right that cannot be denied to any U.S. 
citizen. A fetus is not considered a “person” within the language of 
the U.S. Constitution and, therefore, does not hold any constitutional 
right, including life.229 Thus, a woman has the right to abort her 
pregnancy up until the point that the fetus is born. Of course, we 
know that conservatives would repulse at this argument; instead, 
they would prefer that the right to an abortion be eliminated.230 And, 
the right to choose to have an abortion is more restricted than that 
logic suggests due to a state’s interests related to this fundamental 
right that the Court has recognized. 
 For as long as the Casey framework stands in the abortion con-
text, a state has recognized interests in restricting abortion up until 
a certain point. That point has been demarcated as when “state regu-
lation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in 
the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”231 To 
that end, this discussion is not meant to affect abortion jurispru-
dence, as the argument herein does not aim to suggest or discourage 
any change in abortion framework. For discussion purposes, this 
Note accepts and applies the standing abortion precedent.  
A.   Providing What the Second Amendment Is Missing 
 Second Amendment precedent “nowhere says or implies that the 
government is forbidden to place any restrictions at all on protected 
weapons.”232 A look at Second Amendment jurisprudence, gun safety 
statutes, and policy concerns illuminates an absence of direction for 
courts reviewing gun control legislation,233 which is undeniably im-
pending. This Note’s solution of borrowing from abortion and apply-
ing the “undue burden” framework to gun control is helpful for  
several reasons. 
 Establishing a sort of infrastructure in which Second Amendment 
jurisprudence can develop will provide uniformity and consistency 
                                                                                                                  
 228. Supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text. 
 229. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116-17 (1973); ZIEGLER, supra note 3, at 11. 
 230. See SKOCPOL & WILLIAMSON, supra note 218, at 58 (“Whereas a 58% majority of all 
Americans approve of the decision of the Supreme Court to establish a ‘Constitutional right 
for women to obtain legal abortions in this country,’ only 40% of Tea Partiers approve of that 
court decision and 53% consider it a ‘bad thing.’ ”); ZIEGLER, supra note 3, at 58 (stating that 
the real goal of the pro-life movement is “a total, constitutional ban on abortion”).  
 231. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
 232. Lund, supra note 118, at 341. 
 233. Id. (“Nor does Miller say what restrictions might be permissible.”). 
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within the case law. This is practically important for several rea-
sons.234 For one, uniformity is a long-standing concern of the U.S. Su-
preme Court.235 Likewise, with the evolution of jurisprudence within 
a consistent standard, courts may look to other jurisdictions or fo-
rums that have applied the “undue burden” test to analogize in de-
termining the validity of a statute sub judice. In other words,  
consistency will create coherence and guidance in the Second  
Amendment arena. 
 Further, although abortion claims the “undue burden” framework 
as its own unique standard, the principles underlying this framework 
are not novel to the Court. We see similar reasoning and resulting 
standards in other areas of constitutional analysis that are much 
more established and developed than abortion or gun control. For ex-
ample, in freedom of association (First Amendment) jurisprudence, 
under Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,236 the Court asks whether the 
entrant proposes a substantial obstacle to the expressive institution 
achieving its message.237 Applying this “abortion framework” to gun 
control results in a symbiotic relationship between the two arenas. 
By developing Second Amendment “undue burden” case law, the 
framework and its inter-workings will be more illuminated, which 
will further guide abortion jurisprudence. Guided by “[t]he conven-
tional understanding of fundamental rights in constitutional law” 
and how legislation affecting them must be analyzed,238 this Part pro-
ceeds through the application of the “undue burden” standard to gun 
safety legislation. 
B.   State’s Interests 
 “[I]t makes sense to do everything we can to keep guns out of the 
hands of people who would try to do others harm or to do themselves 
harm.”239 Following an “undue burden” analysis, the Court must first 
                                                                                                                  
 234. See Brownstein, supra note 69, at 870. 
 235. E.g., Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 446-47 (1923); Aman-
da Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1575, 1578 (2008). 
 236. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 237. Id. at 683-84; see also Brownstein, supra note 69, at 872 (“[T]he ‘undue burden’ 
standard of the Casey plurality is reflected in one form or another throughout the funda-
mental rights case law of the past forty years.”); Valeria J. Pacer, Salvaging the Undue 
Burden Standard—Is It a Lost Cause? The Undue Burden Standard and Fundamental 
Rights Analysis, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 301-02 (1995) (discussing other contexts in which 
the “undue burden” logic is seen in constitutional jurisprudence, such as San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)). Cf. Jon S. Ler-
ner, Protecting Home Schooling Through the Casey Undue Burden Standard, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 363 (1995) (applying the “undue burden” standard to home schooling); Winston Pe-
ters, Application of the Undue Burden Test to Mass Transportation: Parallel or Pitfall, 34 
HASTINGS L.J. 491 (1982) (discussing “undue burden” within mass transportation). 
 238. Brownstein, supra note 69, at 867. 
 239. Guns in America Transcript, supra note 161. 
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review and determine that a state has legitimate and compelling in-
terests to protect in regulating the right. In Casey, the Court  
discussed the external implications of abortion, despite being an  
individual right: 
It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the woman 
who must live with the implications of her decision; for the persons 
who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, 
and society which must confront the knowledge that these proce-
dures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act of vio-
lence against innocent human life; and, depending on one’s beliefs, 
for the life or potential life that is aborted.240 
Note the parallel between this analysis and gun control, where the 
impact reverberates well past the gun bearer. If the state has an in-
terest in protecting the life of the fetus once it reaches a certain point 
in the pregnancy,241 then the state surely has an interest in protect-
ing the lives of adults and children living in U.S. society.242 Intuitive-
ly, the latter interest is stronger than the former as the constituents 
are “persons” protected by the U.S. Constitution, whereas an unborn 
fetus is not.243   
 One may argue that the termination of a fetus is sure for every 
abortion, whereas restricting gun control is attempting to limit a 
speculative injury. But the mere capability of each firearm and the 
prevalence of gun violence in the United States, especially recently, 
indicates that this injury is not so speculative. Each American has 
felt the harm caused by firearms, whether personally or through the 
threat that permeates modern-day America.244 This societal fear, as 
well as the decrease in Americans’ safety, caused by unrestricted or 
irresponsible firearm ownership is fodder for a legitimate state concern 
and justifies regulation. 
C.   Burdening the Right 
 Once the Court is comfortable that the state has a sufficient in-
terest to protect, it must determine whether the regulation sub ju-
dice creates an “undue burden” on one trying to access or exercise 
his or her constitutional right.245 “Regulations which do no more 
than create a structural mechanism by which the State . . . may ex-
press profound respect for [its legitimate interests] are permitted, if 
they are not a substantial obstacle to the” fundamental right they 
                                                                                                                  
 240. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). 
 241. See generally id.; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 242. Cf. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 2, at 155-56. 
 243. Roe, 410 U.S. at 133-34; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 244. See EXECUTIVE ORDER FACT SHEET, supra note 137. 
 245. See Brownstein, supra note 69, at 881-82. 
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are regulating.246 Applying this structure from abortion law to gun 
control provides insight into the logical inconsistency embedded 
within conservative rhetoric between the two topics. This Section 
juxtaposes the abortion provisions reviewed in Casey to recently 
suggested gun control provisions within the Casey “undue burden” 
framework and its application.247 
1.   Further Inquiry into Purchaser’s Mental Health  
 More and more, Americans are blaming the mental health system 
instead of easy access to guns for the violence in today’s American 
society.248 But, “it is the combination of mental illness and the availa-
bility of guns that is the real problem.”249 Several high profile shoot-
ers in recent years (including, but not limited to: James Holmes of 
Aurora, Colorado (July 2012),250 Adam Lanza of Sandy Hook (Decem-
ber, 2012),251 Seung-Hui Cho of Virginia Tech University (April 
2007),252 and Aaron Alexis of the Washington Navy Yard (September 
2013)253 had histories of mental health issues before they attacked.254 
Due to this correlation, there is strong support for increasing the 
depth of pre-firearm purchase background checks to include the pur-
chaser’s mental health.255 
                                                                                                                  
 246. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
 247. Note that this argument (applying the “undue burden” framework to gun control 
laws) can be applied to other gun control proposals just the same. See, e.g., Abrams, supra 
note 138, at 499-500 (suggesting a burden shift to allow assault weapons once justified by 
their proponents); Edwards, supra note 207, at 1338 (suggesting federal registration re-
quirements of all firearms and arguing that piecemeal state regulations are ineffective). 
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ly be per se unconstitutional under District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), which 
overruled United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). For the registration requirement, 
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 248. Lydia Saad, Americans Fault Mental Health System Most for Gun Violence, GALLUP 
(Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/164507/americans-fault-mental-health-system-
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Holmes claimed an insanity defense). 
 251. WALSH & HEMMENS, supra note 7, at 373. 
 252. Virginia Tech Shootings Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 3, 2017 12:03 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/31/us/virginia-tech-shootings-fast-facts/ [https://perma.cc/724Z-3ENK]. 
 253. Barbara Starr, Catherine E. Shoichet & Pamela Brown, 12 Victims Slain in Navy 
Yard Shooting Rampage; Dead Suspect ID’d, CNN (Sept. 16, 2013, 10:34 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/us/dc-navy-yard-gunshots/ [https://perma.cc/HZE4-667E]; 
Saad, supra note 248. 
 254. WALSH & HEMMENS, supra note 7, at 384. 
 255. See Guns in America Transcript, supra note 161 (“[I]f we can combine gun safety 
with sensible background checks and some other steps, we’re not going to eliminate gun 
violence, but we will lessen it.”). This increased control is supported by eighty-four percent 
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 Reviewing the informed consent provision, the Casey Court found 
that a woman’s guilt or regret and her assumed resulting mental 
health from receiving an abortion was a legitimate state interest that 
could be protected through abortion restrictions.256 In doing so, the 
Court found the informed consent provision, requiring women to re-
ceive physician-provided information regarding the abortion proce-
dure before the procedure, to be constitutional.257 The only condition 
upon this holding was that the information provided by a physician 
or clinic must be scientifically reliable, with deference to the legisla-
ture on scientific reliability.258 But Justice Ginsburg argued, in her 
Gonzales v. Carhart dissent referencing Casey,259 that women are not 
as ignorant as the Court assumed and would self-impose the appro-
priate psychological ramifications without reinforcement from legis-
lature-prescribed information.260  
 In the gun control context, a state protects society at large, rather 
than the mental health of the applicant, from the applicant’s possible 
mental health afflictions with increased background checks into the 
purchaser’s mental health.261 Contrary to abortion, the mental defi-
ciency of an applicant for the purchase of a firearm does affect others. 
In fact, the number of others affected is seemingly innumerable, de-
pending upon the gunman’s target, and, the others affected are also 
entitled to full constitutional protection for which a state is responsi-
ble. Thus, a state’s interest in protecting society from incompetent 
gun owners appears larger than—or certainly as great as—a state’s 
interest in protecting an unborn fetus or a woman from regret.  
 This is not to say that all mentally ill individuals are dangerous or 
that they should be denied constitutional protections and privileges. 
Instead, to protect the lives and well-being of its citizens, a state has 
an interest in requiring mental health screenings before one may 
                                                                                                                  
of the members of the National Rifle Association. See WALSH & HEMMENS, supra note 7, at 
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 257. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. 
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850; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003)) (contending further that the majority’s 
reliance on morality to ban the procedure was misguided and undermined long-standing 
precedent that morality is irrelevant when reviewing the constitutionality of legislation). 
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 261. See EXECUTIVE ORDER FACT SHEET, supra note 137. 
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purchase a firearm. This argument is not meant to suggest that any 
history of mental illness or mental health treatment should disquali-
fy an individual from purchasing a firearm. Stability, even with a 
history of mental illness, could be shown through treatment or medi-
cation upon such screening. Such restrictions and specifications 
would be left to the state legislatures. Nevertheless, the state is enti-
tled to scientifically reliable information regarding the applicant’s 
mental health and criminal background before allowing the applicant 
to purchase a firearm. 
2.   Eliminating the “Default Proceed” 
 Combine the few current gun control provisions and you end up 
with this: a cloudy personal history delays the NICS background 
check; once seventy-two hours have passed, the “default proceed” 
takes effect and excuses the purchaser from the background re-
quirement.262 The purchaser, whose background is now unknown or, 
at the most, partially known to the seller, walks away with a legal 
firearm despite a possible history that would have prevented the pur-
chase, had the background check run its course.263 Hence, the elimi-
nation of the “default proceed” seems to be the obvious next step in 
increasing safety in firearm ownership. Primarily, similar to the Ca-
sey Court’s discussion supporting its “undue burden” framework, the 
background check requirement under the Brady Act is no more than 
a “structural mechanism by which the State” ensures the safe admin-
istration of firearms.264  
 First, conducting the background check does not require permis-
sion or dependence upon any relative of the applicant. In Casey, the 
Court found that abortion restrictions requiring the consent of the 
woman’s spouse seeking an abortion were unconstitutional due to the 
pressure they would create on the woman to involve him in her deci-
sion.265 The Casey Court upheld the parental consent provision—
requiring consent from the parents of a minor seeking an abortion—
because there was a judicial bypass option where the minor could 
avoid getting her parents’ consent.266 Requiring a background check 
before one can purchase a firearm does not require the purchaser to 
                                                                                                                  
 262. 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1) (2012). 
 263. See EXECUTIVE ORDER FACT SHEET, supra note 137 (“Many of these crimes were 
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involve any private third-party in their decision to purchase a fire-
arm. Thus, the background check requirement is valid under the Ca-
sey reasoning regarding the parental and spousal consent provisions. 
 Second, purchasing a gun should be done with forethought and 
responsibility. So, a twenty-four hour waiting period before purchas-
ing a gun would not unduly impair one’s right to bear arms. “The 
idea that important decisions will be more informed and deliberate if 
they follow some period of reflection does not strike us as unreasona-
ble, particularly where the statute directs that important information 
become part of the background of the decision.”267 In any situation 
that a person purchases a gun and needs the gun immediately, there 
is likely concern of an impulsive and dangerous thought process that 
could intrude upon others’ constitutional and human right to life.268 
Likewise, any planned attack is detrimental to society, as we have 
seen in the recent past.269 Extending the time that it takes for one to 
obtain a firearm, or throwing off their ‘plan’ by a day or two is any-
thing but detrimental to both the safety of society and the purchas-
er’s criminal record. Likewise, the Casey Court found that a twenty-
four hour waiting period for seeking an abortion was not an “undue 
burden” and was therefore constitutional because the abortion could 
be conducted the next day just the same.270  
 If, for some reason, a situation required immediate and violent 
action, police and governmental authorities are in place to serve 
those purposes. Admittedly, there is a glaring counter-factual scenar-
io to the police solution—where a home invasion presents imminent 
danger that cannot be curbed by police action due to the delay re-
quired to call police and for police to arrive.271 As such, Heller estab-
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lished that the Second Amendment entitles one to protect himself 
with a firearm in his home.272 Nevertheless, this situation would only 
exist without a firearm (for those who wish to have one) for the gen-
erally minimal period of time between the beginning of the NICS 
process and the end. Lawmakers have explicitly accepted that previ-
ous felons, or others statutorily restricted from firearm access, may 
be unable to defend themselves with firearms by restricting  
their rights. 
 Even seventy-two hours (the three-day cut-off established by the 
“default proceed”) would not be an undue burden to one’s Second 
Amendment rights under the same reasoning, as one’s health and 
daily function is not affected by the additional wait-period for receiv-
ing a purchased firearm;273 and a state’s interest in ensuring the safe-
ty and stability of the gun purchaser is compelling. In fact, California 
requires a minimum ten-day, or 240-hour, waiting period before any 
sale or transfer of a firearm.274 In the abortion context, the difference 
between one and three days, not to mention ten, may be more bur-
densome on the right-holder, as travel may be a hindrance,275 medical 
needs may be exacerbated by the increased wait-period,276 or other 
time-sensitive needs may be delayed. Even with concerns of immedi-
acy in the abortion context, seventy-two hour waiting periods are on 
the books in some states. So, the lack of medical sensitivity or poten-
tial psychological harm—accepting prima facie the Court’s argument 
in Casey and Carhart—in firearm purchases indicates that increas-
ing the wait-period by eliminating the “default proceed” is not an  
undue burden on one’s fundamental right to bear arms and is  
therefore constitutional. 
 Further, those who are most likely to be affected by the increased 
wait-period are those who the state has a heightened interest in in-
vestigating before allowing them to obtain a firearm. “In fact, the FBI 
has found that a purchaser whose NICS check takes longer than 
[twenty-four] hours to complete is [twenty] times more likely to be a 
prohibited purchaser than other applicants.”277 Applying Casey here, 
“[a] particular burden is not of necessity a substantial obstacle. 
Whether a burden falls on a particular group is a distinct inquiry 
from whether it is a substantial obstacle even as to the [people] in 
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that group.”278 Therefore, that those with messier backgrounds have 
to wait longer to purchase a firearm does not necessitate a substan-
tial obstacle or undue burden. Such a finding would be contrapositive 
to the purpose of the background requirement: to keep those with a 
history that would indicate improper firearm use from owning fire-
arms to further the state’s interest in keeping America safe. 
3.   Reinstating a Ban on Assault Weapons 
 Had the AWB existed at the time, the following shootings (and 
others) could have been avoided or, at least, minimized: Aurora, Col-
orado (July 2012), Sandy Hook (December 2012), San Bernardino 
(December 2015).279 So, Legislators’ concerns when the AWB was first 
enacted in 1994 have not been remedied, and assault weapons con-
tinue to heighten the danger and fatality of gun violence in the  
United States. 
 Reinstating a ban on assault weapons would also not place an un-
due burden on one’s Second Amendment rights because the individu-
al purpose of the Second Amendment—self-defense—can be served 
adequately without assault weapons.280 Assault weapons are mili-
tary-style firearms that are designed to aid in combat with their rap-
id reloading capabilities. Any justified, individual use of a firearm in 
American civilization should not require such type of weapon. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Murder is the most feared violent crime in America.281 Yet the 
murder rhetoric and how to eliminate its effect on U.S. society is 
misguided.282 The rights enumerated within the Second Amendment 
and the right established within the Fourteenth Amendment by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Roe are more similar than their opposing 
proponents and discussion portray. Borrowing the “undue burden” 
framework from abortion lends guidance to the constitutionality of 
gun regulations aimed to protect and preserve American society. An 
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immediate solution to the lack of guidance for reviewing legislation 
affecting one’s Second Amendment rights, as presented herein, is to 
apply the “undue burden” framework from Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. Whether this test is perfect is 
irrelevant, as it will provide guidance, consistency, and some uni-
formity to Second Amendment analyses. A perfect standard is likely 
impossible, but starting with an established standard that proves to be 
transferrable and analogous is a step toward building discussion, ju-
risprudence, and thereby gun safety in America. 
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